Summary: Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speci…cation in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeci…cation. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speci…cation and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally di¤erentiated contractors, the design's speci…cation level is seen to a¤ect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speci…cation and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speci…cation so as to make signi…cant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspeci…cation occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.
Introduction
Horror stories about public works projects frequently appear in the press. Most of the cases that catch the attention of the public eye are characterized by long delays and huge cost overruns, usually associated with changes of the initial design of the projects.
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Accusations against the procuring agencies are focused on the issue of poor initial design. Agencies are portrayed as incompetent, or in some cases as corrupt, for not paying enough attention to the speci…cation of projects before procuring them, thus resulting in renegotiation with the contractor over the projects.
This paper proposes a rationale behind this observed pattern. We show that it is in the interest of the procurer to underinvest in design speci…cation. The intuition behind this result is that, by reducing the design speci…cation, the sponsor reduces the comparative advantage of the most e¢cient …rm in the awarding process. By making …rms more homogeneous the sponsor intensi…es competition and this results in a lower transfer. We also show that the more competitive the market, the better speci…ed the initial design will be. In particular, in a perfectly competitive market, in which …rms earn no rents, no design misspeci…cation takes place.
The main goal of the paper is to use the analysis of the speci…cation design problem to study the cost overruns in public works. We …nd that cost overruns are decreasing in the design speci…cation level. Then, using the relationship between competitiveness and incentives to design speci…cation, we show that when the procurement market is more competitive cost overruns are lower. For this reason, cost overruns are argued to be a consequence of the lack of competition in the procurement market.
We study a simple procurement problem in which a sponsor wants to undertake a single project. There exists a …xed number of horizontally di¤erentiated potential contractors. Prior to the awarding process, the sponsor decides how much to invest in specifying the design (or the blueprint) and this decision becomes public information. As a result of this learning process an initial design is speci…ed. The sponsor awards the construction of the initial design using a competitive mechanism. Once the project is awarded to a contractor and in the course of its realization, new information about the optimal design is generated, and the awarded contractor and the sponsor engage in a bilateral renegotiation to change the initial design to accommodate the new information. Cost overruns, i.e., the di¤erence between the …nal price 2 The Boston harbor tunnel in Boston, USA, and the new subway system in Athens, Greece, are two archetypical examples of public projects plagued with such problems. and the price announced once the project is initially awarded, are a consequence of this renegotiation. As often claimed, a low investment in the initial design speci…-cation is likely to lead to negotiating signi…cant changes and therefore to high cost overruns. 3 Potential contractors in the procurement market are horizontally specialized in a speci…c design. As a consequence of this, the higher the investment in design speci…cation, the higher the advantage of the contractor located closest to the initial design, and the larger its rents. From a di¤erent point of view, however, the higher the investment in initial design speci…cation, the higher the probability that the awarded contractor will be the most e¢cient one, in the sense that the probability that the awarded contractor will be the closest to the …nal project design is higher. For this reason, when the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speci…cation, he has to trade o¤ optimally the reduction of procurement rents with the increase of the probability of choosing the most e¢cient …rm.
This article is related to three di¤erent branches of the literature. First, the paper relates to the literature concerning to explain the cost overruns in public works. Lewis (1986) and Arvan and Leite (1989) study a framework in which: (a) procurement occurs over an extended period, (b) the sponsor and the contractor cannot credibly commit themselves to a long-term contract, (c) the contractor has better information about the cost of completing the project, and (d) most bene…ts accrue-to the sponsor only after the project is completed. In this framework cost overruns occur because the opportunity cost of giving up the project increases. The price of each task depends on the credible threat of stopping the project. This threat is less credible for the later tasks that for the earlier ones. Thus the price that the sponsor pays increases over time, even when the expected cost of the all stages is the same. In the present model there is only one construction stage and, hence, we do not have this dynamic e¤ect. Gaspar and Leite (1989) present a model in which the procurement mechanism induces an ex post downward bias on project cost and consequently cost overruns. In their model, the sponsor has to choose between n potential contractors after receiving a signal about the real cost of the project for each contractor. This signal is the sum of the idiosyncratic cost of the …rm and a measurement error. The …rm with the lowest signal is the …rm with the lowest expected cost. In addition, the expected measurement error for this …rm is negative, leading to underestimation of the true cost, and cost overruns. We are not considering this sort of cost uncertainty, and, hence, do not study this e¤ect in our model.
The present work can also be regarded as a contribution to the literature that tries 3 Ganuza (1997) , an empirical study of cost overruns in public works in Spain, tries to identify the magnitude and causes of cost overruns in larger public works. The largest 256 public work projects undertaken by the Spanish Administration during two years led to cost overruns 77 % of the cases, average cost overruns were 22 % of budgeted costs and 62,7% of cost overruns cases were related to changes in the projects' design during construction.
to endogenize the information structure in principal-agent relationships. In particular, the paper touches upon a line of research that investigates the strategic bene…ts of ignorance in principal agents problems. In a recent paper, Kessler (1998) shows that an agent can have incentives to remain partially uninformed (he decides privately how much information to acquire), since this "strategic ignorance" increases his informational rents since it creates a new state of nature in which the agent is uninformed that makes information revelation more costly for the principal. Cremer (1995) and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) show how it can be in the interest of the principal to remain uninformed if the initial contract can be renegotiated. Ignorance in these models serves as a commitment device, because the principal wants to avoid taking actions in the renegotiation stage that can a¤ect the incentives of the agent in the initial stage. Finally, Lewis and Sappington (1994) study a model in which one seller decides how much information to provide to the consumer about their tastes for the product. Most of their results are extreme, in the sense that the seller decides to provide all the information or none. The trade o¤ is that the information allows the seller to charge higher prices to the high-value buyers, but also creates consumer rents. Our contribution to this literature is to study the e¤ect of the strategic ignorance of the sponsor in the procurement problem and to show how this strategic ignorance can lead to stronger competition among …rms.
Finally, this paper can also be related to the literature that studies the hold-up problem in contract theory, e.g., Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) , Bos and Lulfesmann (1996) , Chung (1991) , Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) , and particularly the seminal paper of Hart and Moore (1988) . These authors have pointed out that under incomplete contracting, when two parties need to invest before contracting, there can be underinvestment. This is due to the fact the parties can not appropriate the full bene…ts of an increase in their investment. Although we study a very speci…c framework, our main result seems to be close to this underinvestment result. In fact, the underinvestment in speci…cation design comes from the fact that the sponsor cannot capture the full bene…t of e¢cient matching. As will become clear later on, our result is, however, driven by a di¤erent cause: the renegotiation of the contract, which is crucial in the literature mentioned above is not relevant in our setting since the incumbent rents are discounted by potential contractors in the auction. In our case, the underinvestment result is due to the following e¤ect: the more the sponsor invests in design speci…cation, the more e¢cient is the matching (the larger is the total surplus), but the larger are the rents captured by the …rms at the auction stage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced while section 3 characterizes the e¢cient solution. Section 4 solves the 4 This result contrasts with the previous literature of principal agent problems with agent's endogeneus information: Cremer and Khalil (1992,1994) , and Cremer, Khalil and Rochet (1998) ; since in these papers the more information the agent has, the more rents the agent gets. See Kessler (1998). model and presents the main results of the paper. In Section 5 we brie ‡y consider the case in which the …rms cannot observe the design speci…cation level. Section 6 discusses the scope and implications of the model and presents conclusions. All proofs are all relegated to a technical appendix.
The model
Consider a sponsor that plans to undertake a project. The payo¤ to the sponsor depends on the project's design d 2 D; where the design space D is a circle of perimeter one. Let d O 2 D denote the optimal design for the sponsor and assume that the payo¤ to the sponsor from a project
, where V is a given real number, so that the payo¤ is decreasing in the distance between d and d
O
. The sponsor is initially uncertain about the exact location of the optimal design so that ex ante, d
O is distributed according to the uniform distribution on the design space.
There are N risk-neutral potential contractors i = f1; :::; N g. The location of each potential contractor d i is uniformly distributed on the circle D. Each potential contractor specializes in one design, its location d i 2 D, and its cost of completing an arbitrary design d is
2 ; where¯is meant to capture the specialization level in the contractors' market.
We assume that the sponsor has to take two decisions related to the project design. In a speci…cation stage, before contracting, the sponsor conducts research on the location of d We now want to describe more precisely the relationship between the initial design and the optimal one. By symmetry, the density of d We will make the following assumptions on this distribution:
Assumption 1 The associated density function to F (dj±) is a symmetric function centered at d I :
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For notational convenience we take an origin in the circle, and we de…ne F (dj±) on the interval Assumption 2 When ± = 0, F (dj±) is equal to the uniform distribution on
]. When ± ! 1, F (dj±) converges to the Dirac delta function on d
; d I ), and F (dj±) is di¤erentiable and increasing in
). [ Figure 1 around here] It is easy to see that, given these assumptions, 6 the initial design is an unbiased estimate of the optimal one and the variance of d O is decreasing on ±.
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After the initial design has been speci…ed and the speci…cation level has become public information, the awarding process takes place. Firms learn their locations (with respect to d I ) and submit their o¤ers, location-price pairs, to the sponsor. All …rms know the locations of their competitors and this information is veri…able by the sponsor. The sponsor awards the public work to the most convenient …rm ± , is an example of distribution that is consistent with these three assumptions.
Under the next alternative assumption to the assumption 3, using the techniques of Milgrom and Shanon (1994) , we would obtain the same monotone comparative results, but assumption 3 allow us to obtain strictly monotonic results. Assumption 3 0 If ± > ± 0 , we can order the distribution functions F (dj±) and F (dj± 0 ) in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance:
An example of distribution that is consistent with this new assumption is the uniform distribution on an interval decreasing in ±,
Therefore, …rms compete in the procurement process like in standard Bertrand competition among heterogenous …rms. The purpose of looking at such simpli…ed setting is to avoid unnecessary complications in the presentation. We can show that introducing the assumption of asymmetric information over the …rm's location does not change the results of the model as long as we do not consider contracts over realizations of
is contractible we can commit to ine¢cient ex-post renegotiations of the optimal design in order to reduce the informational rents (See for example (taking into account its bid and its location). The winning …rm signs a contract to undertake the initial design. During the construction of the project, the sponsor and the …rm learn the optimal design, and change the initial contract using bilateral renegotiation that is represented by a Nash Bargaining procedure.
The sponsor's preferences over …nal outcomes are represented by the following utility function
is valuation of the project and p is the project's price. We want to characterize the sponsor's optimal investment in design speci…cation, taking into account how this investment is going to a¤ect the result of the auction process (the winning …rm and the procurement price) as well as the contract's renegotiation. Summarizing, the time sequence of the model is as follows:
1. The sponsor, knowing the number of …rms in the market, N , decides his expenditures on research, C(±); and speci…es an initial design d I for the project. The speci…cation level ± becomes public information. ) and present their bids to the sponsor. The sponsor awards the public project to the …rm that maximizes his expected utility considering its bids and its location technology.
3. The winning …rm and the sponsor learn the optimal design d O and, through a Nash bargaining procedure, decide the …nal design and the …nal price to be paid for the project.
10
In the next section we study the benchmark case by characterizing the e¢cient solution. Section 4 provides the solution of the model.
E¢cient solution
In this section, we consider the problem of a social planner, who chooses the design speci…cation level ± ¤E , the winning …rm d ¤E i , and the …nal design d ¤E that maximize total surplus (the sum of sponsor's utility and the pro…ts of the winning …rm),
In maximizing total surplus the Che (1993) ). We are assuming that d O is not contractible and therefore we are not exploring this problem. Even though investigating the consequences of the possibility of contracting over d O seems very interesting, assuming that d O is contractible seems unrealistic, since it is a very complex variable (an index of many di¤erent things) and can also be very di¢cult to verify for a third part.
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In Section 5, we relax the assumption of perfect information and we consider the case in which …rms cannot observe the level of design speci…cation.
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This model tries to capture the institutional framework which is used by public administrations to procure large public works. See Ganuza (1997) for a description of the Spanish case which is very similar to the model presented.
planner faces the same informational constraints as the sponsor so that the timing of the e¢cient procurement process can be described as follows:
1. Given the number of …rms in the market, N , the social planner decides research expenditure C(±) and speci…es an initial design d I for the project.
Given d I
, the social planner learns the location of the …rms and chooses the winning …rm.
3. In the course of the construction of the project, the social planner learns the optimal design. Given the location of the winning …rm and the optimal design, the social planner chooses a …nal design for the project.
We solve the model using backwards induction. The next subsection characterizes the …nal design given the winning …rm and the optimal design. Subsection 3.2 will then select the optimal …rm to undertake the project given the initial design, the locations of the …rms and the design speci…cation level. Lastly, subsection 3.3 studies the sponsor problem and provides the e¢cient design speci…cation level.
Final design
In the construction stage, when the social planner learns the optimal design d O , he chooses the …nal design of the project given this optimal design and the location of the winning …rm d ¤E i . Let d ¤E be the optimal …nal design which maximizes the total surplus of the project.
Thus the optimal …nal design is
The optimal …nal design turns out to be an average between the location of the awarded …rm and the optimal project design. The weight of the …rm's location in the average depends on the technological parameter¯. In particular, the larger the specialization of the market (the larger¯) the closer is the …nal design to the location of the awarded …rm. Notice that when¯= 0, the case of homogenous …rms, the cost does not depend on the design and the …nal design is the optimal one. On the contrary, when¯= 1, …rms can only produce one design, and the …nal design is trivially the location of the winning …rm.
The most e¢cient …rm
In the awarding process the social planner has to choose a …rm after learning all …rms' locations, d i , i 2 f1; : : : ; N g. Given d ¤E , the expected surplus of the project depends on the location of the winning …rm and on the speci…cation level of the initial design. Let S(d i ; ±) be the expected surplus of the project if it assigned to a …rm with location d i when the design speci…cation level is ±
The following lemma shows how the expected surplus of the project depends on the …rm's location.
Lemma 1 If ± > 0; then the expected surplus is decreasing in the distance between the initial design and the location of the …rm. If ± = 0; then the expected surplus does not depend on the distance between the initial design and the location of the …rms:
Let d 1 be the closest location to the initial design d I : Then an immediate corollary of the previous Lemma characterizes the …rm that maximizes the expected surplus.
Corollary 2 The e¢cient winning …rm is the closest …rm to the initial design d
The intuition behind this result is the following. The expected surplus of the project will depend on the distance between the winning …rm and the optimal design. Since the initial design is an unbiased estimator of the optimal design, the closest …rm to the initial design is (in expected terms) the closest …rm to the optimal one. Hence, the closest …rm is the most e¢cient …rm ex-ante. On the other hand, if the social planner does not invest in design speci…cation, the optimal design can be with the same probability on any arbitrary place in the circle, implying that the expected surplus of any …rm is the same. Notice, that the …rm with location d 1 may turn out to be not the most e¢cient …rm ex-post and that the probability of this event is decreasing in the design speci…cation. 
Optimal design speci…cation
In the speci…cation stage, the social planner has to choose the investment in design speci…cation knowing the number of …rms. The expected surplus of the project is now only a function of the design speci…cation level.
The next result characterizes the relationship between the expected surplus of the project and the speci…cation level of the design.
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We do not consider the possibility of replacing the incumbent …rm. As a matter of fact, the main results do not change when we introduce this possibility in the model, as long as the sponsor incurs in a positive cost to replace the incumbent …rm.
Lemma 3 The expected surplus of the project is increasing in the speci…cation level of design, ±.
Lemma 3 rests on the fact that the larger is the investment in the project design speci…cation, the better is the matching between the technology of the winning …rm and the sponsor's preferences.
Given the above, the social planner has to choose the investment in design speci…-cation trading o¤ increases in the expected surplus of the project against the cost of specifying the initial project. The optimal speci…cation design level is the solution to this problem
We have:
Proposition 4 The optimal design speci…cation level ± ¤E is increasing in the number of …rms N and the technological parameter¯:
The total procurement surplus depends on the distance between the location of the awarded …rm and the optimal design. When the number of …rms increases, the expected distance between the initial design and the awarded …rm decreases, with the implication that the incentives to make this initial design closer to the optimal one also increase. Following a similar argument, if the technological parameterī ncreases, the incentives to reduce the distance between the awarded …rm and the optimal design also increases (the match between the sponsor's preferences and the contractor's technology becomes most important). The only way for the sponsor to ensure an appropriate match is to reduce the distance between the optimal design and the initial one and this in turn can only be accomplished by increasing the investment in design speci…cation.
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Competitive Solution
We solve the model using backwards induction. The next subsection characterizes the solution of the design's renegotiation. Subsection 4.2 provides the result of the competitive mechanism. Subsection 4.3 concludes the analysis of the model by studying what is the optimal design speci…cation level.
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Notice that we did not impose assumptions on the convexity of the problem and therefore we cannot guarantee that the sponsor's problem is concave. We use the techniques of Edlin and Shannon (1998) , that allow us to get comparative static results in non convex problems, as long as the cross derivatives' conditions are globally satis…ed by the problem, a condition that is satis…ed in our case.
Renegotiation of the initial design
When the awarded contractor and the sponsor learn the optimal design, they bargain over the …nal design d ¤C and the …nal price of the project p F . At this renegotiation stage they know the initial design d I , the procurement price p p , and the location of the winning …rm d ¤C i . We assume that the outcome of the bargaining process is the solution of a generalized Nash bargaining problem. 
Payo¤ functions are de…ned as follows. The sponsor's …nal surplus is the utility of the …nal design minus the new price and the investment in design speci…cation,
and his disagreement point is given by the utility of the initial design minus the procurement price and the investment in design speci…cation,
The awarded …rm's …nal pro…t is the new price minus the cost of the new design,
Its disagreement point is the procurement price minus the cost of the initial design,
. Given these payo¤ functions, the Nash bargaining problem can be rewritten as follows
and its solution is characterized in the next lemma.
Lemma 5 The bargaining solution for the …nal design and the …nal price is given by:
We are assuming that in this stage the sponsor and the …rm both learn the optimal design. It is easy to check that as long as the sponsor knows the location of the awarded …rm, this assumption is not necessary. Suppose that only the awarded …rm learns the optimal design and it has to report it to the sponsor. The …rm will report the design that maximizes its expected rents, but given the result of the renegotiation, the expected rents are ® (¼ S + ¼ F ¡ ½ S ¡ ½ F ), and the design that maximizes these rents is the optimal design.
Since the bargaining procedure is e¢cient, we obtain the same …nal design as in the e¢cient solution
The …nal price can be seen to be equal to the procurement price, plus the cost to change from the initial design to the …nal one, plus a proportion ® (bargaining power) of the surplus generated by the bargaining process:
Price Competition
Procurement proceeds in three steps. First, …rms observe ± and d
I
and learn their location with respect to d I . Second, each …rm submits a bid, a location-price pair. Third, the sponsor, taking into account the location of the …rms and the price, awards the project to the …rm that submitted the bid that maximizes its expected utility U S . The next proposition characterizes the solution at the procurement stage.
Lemma 6
The closest …rm wins the auction d ¤C i = d 1 , and the procurement price is
where d 1 is the closest …rm to the initial design and d 2 is the second closest …rm.
The procurement price has three components: the cost of the initial project, the expected rents from future renegotiation (which are discounted), and the winning …rm's expected pro…t S(d 1 ; ±) ¡ S(d 2 ; ±). o Proposition 7 The expected pro…t of the winning …rm is increasing in the speci…-cation level of the design ±. This is an important result for the paper: The higher is the speci…cation level of the design, the higher is the market power of the winning …rm, because the …rm's location becomes more important. The implication of this result is that the sponsor can use the speci…cation level of the design to control …rms' rents.
Initial design optimal speci…cation
The sponsor has to …nd the speci…cation of initial design that maximizes its expected surplus ± ¤C , given the expectations on the procurement and renegotiation stages
Substituting the expression of the …nal price into the expected surplus we obtain
and substituting the expected procurement price into this expression and simplifying we obtain
we …nally obtain that
and the initial design optimal speci…cation is the solution to
Comparing this expression to (1) it is easy to see that the expected surplus of the sponsor does not depend on the location of the …rm closest to the initial design, i.e., the winning …rm (as is the case in the e¢cient solution) but depends on the location of the …rm which is the second closest to the initial design. Apart from this fact, the problem is identical to the e¢cient one in (1) and the intuition of the results presented in the following Proposition is the same as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 8
The optimal design speci…cation level ± ¤C in the competitive case is increasing in the number of the …rms N and the technological parameter¯:
The following proposition presents the main result of the paper.
Proposition 9
The competitive speci…cation level is less than the e¢cient design speci…cation level, ± ¤C < ±
¤E
. The di¤erence between the e¢cient solution and the competitive solution converges to 0 as the number of …rms goes to in…nity As was remarked above, the sponsor's problem would be equivalent to the social planner's problem if in the latter we considered the second closest …rm instead of the closest …rm. Using this fact, it is easy to see the intuition of the proposition. From Proposition 1 we know that the larger the number of …rms, the closer the winning …rm to the initial design, and the larger the incentives to specify the initial design. Using the same argument, if we take the second closest …rm instead of the closest …rm, there should be less incentives to specify the initial design.
This proposition shows an important trade-o¤ in design speci…cation. Assume that the starting point is the competitive solution. If the sponsor increases the level of speci…cation the total surplus of the procurement process goes up. This is due to the fact that the …nal design is closer in expected terms to the optimal one and the winning …rm is the most likely to be the most e¢cient …rm to undertake the …nal design, ex-post. On the other hand, the increase in design speci…cation also increases the rents of the winning …rm, and this e¤ect turns out to compensate the …rst one.
14 Another way to see the intuition behind the result is that by reducing design speci…cation, the comparative advantage of the closest …rm in the awarding process decreases. In other words, the sponsor underinvests in the initial speci…cation of the project to make potential contractors more homogeneous, with the underlying goal to intensify competition and reduce its expected transfer. 15 Finally, when the number of …rms goes to in…nity, the rent of the closest …rm converges to 0 because the expected distance with the second closest …rm also converges to 0. In such case, the sponsor's trade o¤ between reducing the …rm rents and increasing the procurement surplus is eliminated as can be seen from the fact that
Cost overruns
In the introduction we mentioned the relationship existing between design misspeci…cation and cost overruns. This subsection is devoted to formalize this relationship. Usually cost overruns are de…ned as the di¤erence between the procurement price and the …nal price:
The next result derives the relationship between expected cost overruns and the initial design speci…cation.
14 Observe that in the realistic case in which a procurement agent manages the procurement process on behalf of a procurement principal, the renegotiation of the initial design can create room for collusion between the procurement agent and the awarded contractor. While we leave this case for future research, we conjecture that collusion increases the principal's incentives to specify the initial design and design misspeci…cation would turn out to be lower than in the case we discuss in this paper.
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We start the paper with a quote from Oscar Wilde, in which he points out that the auctioneers are reluctant to provide good information about the goods they are selling. This observation can be explained using a similar argument to ours. Assume that an auctioneer wants to sell a good using a second price auction. There are two risk neutral bidders. Each bidder likes the good with probability 1 2 (his valuation is high V H ) and with probability 1 2 he does not like the good (his valuation is low V L ). Given the public information, they have a common expected valuation If the auctioneer does not disclose any information about the good then: the expected price is higher P ND = 1 2 V H + 1 2 V L ; the bidder with the lowest valuation can get the good and there are no bidders' rents. As in our model, the lack of information about the good leads to …ercer competition between bidders although can produce ine¢cient allocations.
Proposition 10 Expected cost overruns of the project, C CO , are decreasing in the design speci…cation level, ± In other words, since cost overruns are due to reforms of the initial design, the better the initial design, the fewer reforms of the design will be needed and this implies lower expected cost overruns. An immediate Corollary characterizes the important relationship between competition and cost overruns.
Corollary 11 Expected cost overruns of the project C CO are decreasing in the number of the …rms N .
Proof: Immediate from propositions 8 and 10.
In other words, the more competitive the procurement market, the lower expected cost overruns will be. This might be an important result since it shows that any policy devoted to promote competition in the procurement market, may have the positive e¤ect of reducing cost overruns.
Endogenous market supply
In this section we report the consequences of introducing an endogenous market supply in the model. That is, instead of assuming a …xed number of …rms, we introduce a new stage in the game in which …rms decide whether to enter into the market (paying a …xed cost) or not.
The result of this extension is quite surprising, as endogenizing the number of …rms in the market might lead to multiplicity of equilibria with the following intuition. Firms decide to enter into the market when their expected pro…ts at least compensate the entry cost. On the other hand, expected pro…ts of any one …rm depend positively on the speci…cation level of the design. Yet we know that the speci…cation level of the design depends positively on the number of …rms. Therefore, there may exist equilibria, with few …rms, low expected pro…ts, and a low speci…cation level and equilibria with many …rms, high expected pro…t and a high level of design speci…cation.
This multiplicity of equilibria may be a source of ine¢ciency since, from the point of view of the sponsor, it is always better to have many …rms. Yet, due to a coordination failure, he may be stuck with a narrow market and a high level of cost overruns.
Imperfect Information
In this section we brie ‡y consider the case in which …rms cannot observe the level of design speci…cation. The timing and structure of the game are the same as in the previous section. In the last stage of the game (given the vector (d
the renegotiation process between the sponsor and the winning …rm has the same solution that in the previous game. Therefore, given the optimal design and the winning …rm, the …nal design is the same that in the previous section d ¤II = d ¤C . As a consequence, the focus is on the procurement stage and the design speci…cation problem.
Procurement Stage
The procurement proceeds as in the previous section. In order to solve the problem we assume that the …rms have common expectation regarding the project's speci…ca-tion level ± 0 . Given this expectation, we obtain similar results to those in the previous section: the closest …rm to the initial design wins the auction d
The sponsor's problem
Given the above, the sponsor's ex ante payo¤ is
and substituting the …nal price we get
Notice that, when unobserved, the speci…cation level chosen by the sponsor cannot a¤ect …rms' expectation ± 0 so that the term
does not depend on ±. Given this the sponsor's problem is equivalent to the following problem
and we have the following result.
Proposition 12 If the winning …rm has some bargaining power ® > 0, the competitive speci…cation level with imperfect information is higher than the e¢cient design speci…cation level ± ¤II > ± ¤E : If the sponsor has all the bargaining power ® = 0, in the ex post renegotiation of the contract, then the solution is the e¢cient solution.
Observe that the sponsor knows that …rms discounts design renegotiation rents in their bids but is unable to a¤ect these discounts. For this reason, he tries to reduce …rms' ex post rents by overinvesting in design speci…cation. The higher the investment in design's speci…cation, the lower the rents of the winning …rm during the renegotiation process.
In order to calculate the sponsor's total surplus note that the sponsor has a dominant strategy ± ¤II given that he can not a¤ect …rms' expectations. Although this is not important to derive the equilibrium design speci…cation level (as ± ¤II turns out to be a dominant strategy, given the continuation game) in a Nash equilibrium …rms correctly forecast the sponsor's strategy, so that ± 0 = ± ¤II . Using this fact, the next corollary shows that the sponsor is worse o¤ than in the case in which …rms can observe the design speci…cation level.
Corollary 13 Under unobservability of design speci…cation level, the Nash equilibrium payo¤ for the sponsor is
and is lower than the Nash equilibrium payo¤ of the case with observable design speci…cation level
Corollary 13 provides a reasonable result. When comparing a Stackelberg game (the case in which …rms can observe ±) with the case in which …rms cannot observe such ±, the sponsor's pro…ts are larger in the former case. An important implication of this corollary is that the sponsor has incentives to make the speci…cation level observable. In the case of public works this could imply, somewhat surprisingly, that the sponsor has an interest in building up a reputation for badly specifying the initial design of public projects.
Conclusions
Since public procurement accounts for a signi…cant fraction of economic activity and since it is not unusual that public project end up with a …nal cost several times higher than the initial estimates, cost overruns are a very important issue for economists, politicians and the public.
The …rst goal of this paper was to provide an explanation for cost overruns in public procurement. We have developed a model in which cost overruns arise as a consequence of the renegotiation of an initial contract. Given existing uncertainty on the project's optimal design, the sponsor can devote resources to provide an initial estimate. Since this is costly, the sponsor is likely to provide a description of the project that, while an unbiased estimate of the optimal location will di¤er from it in all probability. Given this, as the project's optimal location is learned in the realization stage, the awarded contractor and the sponsor are likely to have strong incentives to engage in a bilateral renegotiation to modify the initial design of the project. Cost overruns arise as a consequence of this design renegotiation.
Our results show that in equilibrium the sponsor has incentives to invest less in the design's speci…cation than would be e¢cient (keeping into account only the cost of the initial design speci…cation). The intuition of the result is that by reducing design speci…cation, the sponsor promotes …ercer competition among contractors: Lowering the initial design speci…cation, homogenizes horizontally di¤erentiated potential contractors and in particular decreases the comparative advantage of the most e¢cient …rm.
This paper sheds light on one trade o¤ in public procurement. While a more accurate speci…cation of an initial design increases the probability to award the project to the most e¢cient …rm, it also increases the rents of the latter. Since under perfect competition there no design misspeci…cation takes place (as rents are eliminated) the above mentioned trade o¤ disappears and the initial design speci…-cation is the e¢cient one. Given this cost overruns can be seem as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market and we can conclude that public policies promoting competition in procurement markets are also likely to reduce cost overruns in public works.
Appendix A Proofs of the paper ]. We need to state some preliminary facts before we start with the proofs of the results. ). These distributions are ordered in a strict …rst order stochastic dominance sense,
Proof of lemma 1: The expected surplus of an arbitrary …rm d i given that the initial design is d I = 0 and the speci…cation level is ±; is
nto the expression and then factorizing, we get
] according to F (dj±); this expectation is
Notice that, due to the fact that the design space is a circle, there are two distances between d i and d O and we have to consider only the shortest length arc.
By using the symmetry of F (dj±) we get
Integrating by parts the second term we get
It is interesting to see the special cases ± = 0 and ± = 1. We have that
If there is no investment in design speci…cation, the expected surplus does not depend on the location of the …rm. On the other hand
when the initial design is the optimal one, case ± = 1, the expected surplus only depends on the location of the …rm. For interior cases, we di¤erentiate S(d i ; ±) with respect to d i
By using that F (
is increasing in ±; and @S(d i ;0) @d i = 0; we can conclude that given the …rm's location d i , this expression is negative for ± > 0: Then the surplus is decreasing in the distance between the initial design and the …rm's location.
Proof of lemma 3: The expected procurement surplus, given that the winning …rm is the closest …rm to the initial design, is
Therefore, to prove the lemma we have to show that
First, we analyze the sum of the expected quadratic distance between the optimal design and all the …rms. Let A i be the expected quadratic distance between the optimal design and the …rms which is …rm i closest to the initial design.
Rearranging terms we get
It is clear that this sum does not depend on ± since the relative position of the …rms is not important when we are adding all the distances. Therefore, the derivative of this sum respect to ± has to be 0,
The next step is to show that
> 0 for every i 6 = 1 . Using similar computations to those in the proof of Lemma 1 we get
Notice, that d X and d o are independent variables, and we do not need to specify the joint distribution.
Integrating by parts
Finally, taking the derivatives respect to ±
Since
). But given that the derivative of the sum is 0, and given that
> 0 for every i 6 = 1; this implies that @A 1 @± < 0, which concludes the proof.
Proof of proposition 4: From lemma 3 we know that the expected surplus E d 1 fS(d 1 ; ±)g is increasing in ±. Monotonicity and the assumptions that C 0 (0) = 0 and lim ±!+1 C(1) = 1 imply that the solution should be interior ± ¤E 2 (0; 1). We are going to use a result of Edlin and Shannon (1998) , that allows us to obtain strictly monotonic static comparative results without making assumptions on the concavity of the distribution functions.
Theorem 14 (Edlin and Shannon (1998) ) Let S ½ <; f : < £ < ! <; x ¤ 2 argmax x2S f (x; t ¤ ) and x 0 2 argmax x2S f (x; t 0 ): Suppose that f is C 1 and has increasing marginal returns, and that
We have to check that we can apply this theorem to our decision problem. Our problem is:
We de…ne the objective function f (x; t) as
Where, x = ±; t = N;and S = < + [ 0: Therefore the only condition that we have to check is that f (x; t) has increasing marginal returns, so that @f @t is increasing in t:
To verify this condition, we compute the cross derivative
. First, from di¤er-entiating with respect to ±, we get
Integrating by parts @f @± and di¤erentiating with respect to N we get
> 0 we get that the whole expresion is positive, and f (±; N ) has increasing marginal returns. Therefore, applying Theorem 14, we conclude that the optimal design speci…cation level ± ¤E is increasing in the number of …rms N:
We use the same argument for¯: Then, we compute the cross derivative,
This expresion is positive, since by lemma 3 we know that E d 1 fS(d 1 ; ±)g is increasing in ±, and this implies that
is negative. Then, applying theorem 14, we conclude that the optimal design speci…cation level ± ¤E is increasing in the technological parameter¯.
Proof of lemma 5: The bargaining problem between the winning …rm and the sponsor is
From totally di¤erentiating with respect to d ¤C and p F we get the two …rst order conditions. After simplifying we get
The solution of this system is
which concludes the proof.
Proof of lemma 6: First, we recall two previous results that we will use for the proof. By Lemma 5 we know that the negotiation is e¢cient and that given ± and the winning …rm, the competitive mechanism produces the same surplus as in the e¢cient solution. By Lemma 1 we know that given ± > 0 the closest …rm is the …rm that produces the largest expected surplus. Second we are going to normalize the bids in the auction. Assume that the bids are
With this normalization, we can see that ¼ i is the expected pro…t of the …rm i when it presents the bid b i . Using this normalization, when the sponsor grants the project to …rm i his expected surplus is
Suppose that the …rm d j 6 = d 1 is winning the project. Since, by individual rationality ¼ j¸0 , the sponsor surplus must be lower than or equal to S(d j ; ±) ¡ C(±): But, in this case the closest …rm d I can o¤er a better bid, with a pro…t ¼ 1 = S(d 1 ; ±) ¡ S(d j ; ±) ¡ ², with ² > 0. The sponsor obtains a higher surplus with this o¤er (S(d j ; ±) ¡ C(±) + ²) and the closest …rm obtains positive pro…ts. Therefore, the winning …rm must be the closest …rm to the initial design d ¤C i = d 1 . Using the same argument, we conclude that the procurement price must be
It is easy to check that the closest …rm can not increase this o¤er. This is because the second closest …rm could get the project with a bid equal to b 2 = C 2 (d
Proof of Proposition 7: By Lemma 3 we know the expected pro…t of the winning …rm is the di¤erence between the expected surplus with its location and the expected surplus with the location of the second closest …rm to the initial design: . This is not possible, since in this case ± ¤E provides more surplus to the sponsor than ± ¤C :
This inequality follows from ± ¤E 2 argmaxfE d 1 ;d O fS(d 1 ; ±)¡C(±)gg and ¦(± ¤E ) < ¦(± ¤C ). Proof of proposition 10: The expected cost overruns are
Since C 1 (d I ) does not depend on ±; in order to show that the cost overruns are decreasing in ±; we only need to show that
By plugging the expression of the optimal design d ¤C =¯d
j±g, and then factorizing, we get
Therefore we need to show that E
2 j±g is decreasing on ±: But this was proved in the proof of Lemma 3.
We denote by R(±) the rent of the awarded …rm in the renegotiation of the design.
Rearranging terms and using straightforward calculations we get 
